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1. INTRODUCTION 
There are quite a few articles that deals with the issue of the optimal financial 
structure for a firm when considering the relationship between financial contracts 
and labor contracts. Among them, the pioneering paper by Garvey f!j Swan (GS) 
1992 is a particularly remarkable article by its simplicity and the clarity of their 
results. The main objective of this note is to extend their model to account for 
more dynamic effects, in order to test the soundness of their conclusions. More 
specifically, in their original article es show, using a one-period model where 
cooperation between workers plays an important role and where labor contracts 
are incomplete, that when firms are mainly debt financed (mentioned as the nor-
mal financial source in the Japanese corporations), workers become less selfish in 
comparison to the case where they work for equity-financed companies (which is 
the most common scenario in the US system). This fact allows the authors to 
conclude that under their one-shot model, debt-financed firms are Pareto superior 
with respect to equity-financed corporations. 
Their argument makes use of a reward scheme for the workers that combines pay-
offs, assigned through a tournament process on an ex-ante basis, and a bonus, 
established by the manager after the workers have made their effort. 
3 
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Under this scenario, and assuming a manager's utility function that weighs 
shareholders', bondholders' and workers' interest, the authors show that the man-
ager's incentive to bonus helping behavior increases as debtholders' interests be-
come prominent to shareholders' ones, whenever workers' interests is considered 
by the manager. 
We show that es's main result concerning debt financing superiority over 
equity financing to stimulate workers to cooperate cannot be maintained, once 
labor contracts are made more complete. More specifically, we prove that in 
situations where the workers' power is not negligible, the first-best solution can 
be achieved through a combination of financing that weighs equity more heavily 
than debt. This result, which is opposite to es, is relevant because fits better 
a dynamic setting where possible longer manager-workers relationships tend to 
make contracts more complete. To model this fact, we extend the es model 
to two periods, and we consider the workers are hired with a two-period labor 
contracto This longer relationship brings up implicit agreements between the 
agents to reduce uncertainty. In particular, we assume that workers know at the 
end of the first period how their second-period helping efforts will be paid. This 
measure will undoubtedly result in upgrading the completeness of the contract, 
leading the workers to reinforce their cooperative behavior, in spite of the existence 
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of sorne degree of contract incompleteness, a la es, as the manager determines 
ex-post first-period bonus. 
Beyond the es article, in a framework with more complete contracts, the 
degree of workers' power becomes the critical parameter to define the superiority 
of one type of financing over the other. An exclusive equity financing scheme 
is the first-best solution when worker power is high. As the worker influence 
in the management of the firrn dirninishes, it is optirnal for the firm to obtain 
an increasing share of the funds through debt, until debtholders' power becomes 
equal to shareholders'. Beyond this situation, for lower workers' power values, 
the optirnal financial structure cannot lead to the first-best solution. Even, in the 
extreme situation, when the workers' interests are not considered by the manager, 
the classical Modigliani-MilIer result is recovered, stating the financial irrelevance 
of firrn's policy. 
We have organized this note in four sections. The second section describes the 
es rnodel and their rnain results, while the third describes an alternative rnodel. 
'Ve finish with sorne concluding remarks. 
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2. GARVEY AND SWAN MODEL 
Description of GS Model 
1/ Two risk-neutral identical workers (i = 1,2) with a null reservation utility, 
hired in a competitive labor market. These agents make two types of effort. An 
individual one, ai, and a helping one, hi, which is attributed to non-i worker. 
2/ An opportunity cost of effort described by a function C(ai, h i ) identical for 
. . (ac ac a2c _ a2c a2c ) both workers and that satlsfies. aai > O , ahi > O , aai,hj - O , aa; > O , ah; > O 
3/ Workers' performance measure is stochastically conditioned by a random 
variable <p with a distribution function F and a density function f which is sym-
metrically and unimodal. Specifically; worker 1 's performance = al + h2 - ~ and 
worker 2's = a2 + h l + ~ 
4/ Total worker output is given by Q = al + a2 + hl + h2. 
5/ Total output of the two-worker team (Q) is observed by the manager, but 
in court Q + 'Y is only verifiable. ('Y is a random variable defined over an interval 
(], "Y) with a density function 9 and a distribution G). 
6/ Workers' reward scheme consists of two parts: The first one is set prior 
to workers' participation, based on a tournament scheme to provide incentives to 
individual efforts. It pays p to the best-performance worker and w to the worst. 
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An additional compensation may be offered after workers have made their efforts. 
This enables the manager to reward each worker with an amount 8 in order to 
motivate helping efforts hi l. 
The Time-Line of the Game: 
1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 
1/ Founder sets corporate governance and workers' reward scheme. 
2/ Investors and workers choose whether or not to participate. 
3/ Workers can choose direct effort andj or helping effort. 
4/ Manager observes performance and chooses 8. 
5 j Workers receive payments {p, w} 
3. GS RESULTS 
5/ 
The authors consider a general situation where the firm can be financed through 
debt andj or equity, and workers can have a voice on the board. They model this 
framework, making use of a manager's utility function that weighs shareholders', 
debtholders' and workers' interests. 
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Specifically, the problem to be solved by the manager is: 
MaX{6}UMger = o:.uSholders + {3UDholders + 2(1 - o:. _ (3)uWorkers 
uSholder = /;(Q -D - w - p - 28 + ,)dG(r) 
uDholder = /: (Q _ w - p - 28 + ,)dG(r) + D(l - G(;Y)) (1) 
uWorker = pF(El,2) + w(1- F(El,2)) - C(al, h¡) + 8 
;y = D - Q + w + p + 28 
Where;Y is the criticallevel of, that defines the default zone , <;Yo uWorker is 
the utility function for worker 1, that can be taken as the representative worker 
by the symmetry of the problemo Its expression is obtained taking into account 
that worker 1 wins the tournament premium, p, if al + h2 - ~ > a2 + hl + ~ {:::> 
Bonus 8 value is determined by making use of the following derivative: 
{)u~ger = -2(0:.(1 - G(;Y)) + (3G(;Y)) + 2(1 - o:. - (3) (2) 
To sign this expression, the authors distinguish different financing situations: 
- Equity financing 
In this case {{3,;Y} = 0, and (2) becomes {)U;~ger = 2(1 - 20:.), which is a negative 
expression under the normal assumption of giving workers no absolute control 
over the executive board (o:. > ~)o This fact leads to an optimal 8* = 0, and 
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moving backwards to the workers' maxímizatíon problem, to a null helpíng effort. 
It is important to note that this result relies critically on the fact that this is a one-
period problem and workers have no bargaining power over the manager, because 
they cannot punish low manager's reward, 8, through the implementation of low 
effort levels in future periods. Thus, workers do not cooperate among themselves. 
Furthermore, thís behavíor is maintained independently of their presence on the 
board (1 - ex). This is rather remarkable because one of the justifications for 
allowing workers to have a voice on the executive board is precisely to try to 
stimulate their specific investments (cooperative effort). The more they cooperate 
the higher their bargaining power, leading eventually to higher rewards. This 
intuitive result is recovered in the two-period model of the next section. In that 
case, workers have a real voice on the board 2, because of their ability to retaliate 
in future periods with measures such as strikes (Iow effort implementation). 
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- Debt and Equity Financing 
This situation is modeled considering a f3 > a and a < ~ . In that case an 
interior solution ó* > O follows, and this generates a positive helping effort h* > o. 
A1though in a one-period framework, workers now enjoy a certain bargaining 
power because they can punish the manager through changes in the threshold 
level, 1, that defines the default zone. Once they made a low effort h, there will 
be an increase of 1 which generates a higher default probability that will end 
up penalizing the debtholders who are the most important individuals for the 
manager (remember, f3 > a). Therefore, the manager will try to diminish these 
perverse effects, linking the discretionary reward Ó to the production level Q 3. 
This fact will ultimately lead the workers to implement a positive helping effort. 
es show that the higher workers' willingness to implement helping efforts 
makes this financing situation Pareto superior to the previous one. 
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4. ALTERNATIVE GAME 
Now we extend the es model to study the soundness of their results. Specifically, 
we review the following points: 
1/ The linkage between financial structure and workers' cooperative behavior. 
2/ The irrelevance 01 the workers' presence on the board lar the exclusive equity 
financing case unless they enjoy absolute control. 
3/ The Pareto superior condition 01 the debt-financing approach with regard 
to the equity-financing approach. 
To develop our analysis, we consider a game that intends to be the natural 
extension of the es game for a two-period case. In particular, the first period 
is identical to the es model, the second period is different in two points. First, 
investors do not receive returns at the end of the first period, just when the 
game finishes (long-term financing). Secondly, workers' bonuses 6 + 6', are paid 
at the end of the game, but, their structure is fixed at the end of the initial 
periodo Furthermore, we also assume that both bonus have the same structure, 
that is, if the manager decides a first-period bonus 6 = >..Q, then, 6' = >..Q' being 
Q (Q') first-period (second-period) output. This assumption, that makes labor 
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contract more complete, is in sorne sense a natural complement to the increase 
in the number of periods of the game. To motivate this, we have to consider 
each workers' helping effort as an individual commitment action favoring team 
results. This is because there is a misattribution between team members of their 
particular helping effort 4 . Within this scheme, the entrepreneur will be interested 
in signaling the commitment of the firm with regard to their workers in order to 
reduce the uncertainty of a longer (two-period) relationship. A natural way to do 
so, is defining the reward scheme of the labor contract as ex-ante as possible 5. 
Another question is to settle A' = A. This is made for simplicity in the compu-
tation. Beyond this, we may also justify this assumption if we think that defining 
a certain structure of contract is complex enough that it would be optimal to 
maintain the same pattern for at least two periods. In fact, this is what is seen 
in the real world, where firms do not change the percentage of revenues devoted 
to bonus the workforce very frequently. 
Finally for tractability, we particularize, to a second-order polynomial effort 
cost function C(ai, hi) = ~(a; + h;) which satisfies the required derivative condi-
tions. 
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Timing of the Game: 
Period Period 
) ( 
1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/ 6/ 7/ 
The first five stages are as in game l. 
6/ Workers after observing A and the previously defined p and w) choose 
second-period individual and helping efforts (a~ ) hD 
13 
7/ Stochastic variable 'Y is realized and workers and investors receive returns 
contingent on the overall output Q + Q'. 
5. SOLVING THE GAME 
5.1. Equity Financing with Workers' Voice on the Board 
We model this situation as GS, that is, we assign a weight a and 1 - a in the 
manager's utility function to account for shareholder's and workers' power on the 
board. The equilibrium is computed straightforwardly using backward induction. 
The result is given in the following proposition: 
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PROPOSITION 1 
The first-best solution when firms are financed exclusively by equity can be oh-
tained when the workers' power is equal to one-half. For lower values of the 
workers' power (1 - a), the equilibrium of the game, is given by: 
* * h* h* 0(30-1) A * _ 0(110-5) 
al = a2 = 1 = 2 = 8902-780+17 - 8902-780+17 (3) 
p* = w* < O ai' = a*z' = hi' = h*z' = A * 
Proof 
See point one in the Appendix. 
We have characterized an equilibrium result with positive helping effort, under 
an equity-financing scheme, which is in contrast to the GS model. Moreover, 
the symmetry of the effort cost function considered leads the helping effort to be 
linked with the individual one in a way which makes it non sense to talk about 
selfish behavior in effort implementation. Consequently, the tournament scheme 
looses its meaning (p* - w* = O), and the rewards are shared symmetrically by 
both workers as a team. Note the importance of considering a two-period scheme, 
workers in this situation enjoy bargaining power to punish a possible manager's 
low reward through their low second-period efforts. Under this dynamic it makes 
sense to obtain workers who are bonded with the firm ({p*, w*} < O). In fact, 
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this is a common feature in models where workers have to invest in firm-specific 
human capital (helping effort in our terminology) 6. Moreover, this payment is a 
necessary condition to set high workers' reward (high A) which, in the end, will 
induce workers to implement high efforts, even as high as the social optimum 
(a = h = 1). This is the case, whenever the workers' power is equal to the 
shareholders'. This is in contrast to GS's, where the incompleteness of labor 
contracts leads not only to a superiority of debt financing, but makes the first-
best solution unreachable. 
Observing the equilibrium, we also note that first-period efforts are lower than 
the second-period ones. The logic behind this result is the following: in the first 
period workers choose low efforts, otherwise it might be optimal for the manager to 
define a take-the-money-and-run-strategy by setting A = O and giving up second-
period production Q'. The manager, in so doing, reacts by establishing a high A 
to stimulate high second-period efforts, (in the Appendix we show that a~~) = 
a>. aa' ah' ) 8(h) < O, and that 8>' = 8>' = 1 . 
Regarding the impact of workers' power (1- a) in the equilibrium, we find, a 
negative dependence between A and a. This fits with the intuitive linkage between 
the workers' bonus settled by the manager (proportional to A) and the workers' 
weight in the manager compensation scheme (1 - a). What is relevant is that this 
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negative correlation does not require the workers to have absolute control oi the 
board. Consistent with this fact, we observe an increase in the effort implemented 
by the workers in both periods as 1 - Q increases. Finally, it is also remarkable 
that the participation of the workers in firm's management tends to equilibrate 
the efforts they provide in each period u~(a~!~/) > O), and with this, each period 
production (Q -t Q'). This is quite important for the firm, to maintain a balanced 
production pattern. 
We can conclude by saying that, in this equity-financing scheme, workers' 
presence in the management of the firm (given the reward scheme proposed), 
generates benefits in terms of the firm's value. In the extreme situation where 
shareholders and workers share equal responsibility (Q = ~), the social optimum 
value for the firm can be obtained. 
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5.2. Debt and Equity Financing 
In this framework, we are interested to characterize the optimal combination of 
debt and equity through which a fum can reach its first-best value. We show that 
this combination critically depends on the workers' power, W = 1 - a - f3. The 
specific result is given in the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 2 
When firms can be financed with debt and equity, the first-best solution can be 
reached once the workers' power, w, is between ~ and ~. Within this dominium, 
shareholders' power has to be superior to debtholders', in particular, a = ~ -
~w + [(~ - ~W)2 - ~(1 - 3w + W2)P/2 2: f3 = 1 - a - w, being f3 = O for w = ~, 
and f3 = ~ for w = ~. For w values lower than ~, it is not possible to implement 
the first-best solution by varying the financial structure of the firm, and even this 
structure becomes irrelevant under the extreme situation of null worker power. 
Proof 
See point 2 in the Appendix. 
We show that once labor contracts become more complete, the workers' power 
turns out to be the key parameter that determines the type of financing providing 
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a higher firm value. This parameter is so nodal within this alternative model that 
only within a range of positive w values, the first-best solution can be defined. If 
we draw a graphical representation of the relationship between a, {3 and w, that 
lead to the first-best solution, we get the following picture: 
1/30.35 0.375 0.425 0.45 0.475 0.5 
\Ve see that in the first-best dominium, any decrease in the workers' power 
has to be balanced with a reduction in shareholders' power and a simultaneous 
increase in debtholders'. Using this strategy, the managerial's disincentives to 
reward workers with decreasing power are exactly offset by the incentives linked 
to a rise in debtholders' power with regard to shareholders' 7. The result is a 
maintenance of workers' social optimum efforts (a = h = 1). This dynamic works 
up to the point w = ~. For lower values of w, the formal condition that lead to 
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the first-best outcome implies a lower shareholders' power with regard to workers', 
but, we neglect this scenario as we do not consider worker-managed firms. 
This exposition clarifies the importance of allowing workers to participate in 
firm's decisions. In so doing, they increase their power and the financial structure 
of the firm turns out to be relevant in generating profitability. 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The main goal of this note has been to extend sorne of the results obtained by 
Garvey and Swan (1992) in a model where there is an interaction between financial 
and labor contracts. We have shown that their conclusions critically depend on 
the particular framework they consider, specifically the degree of labor contract 
incompleteness. 
The basic result of their article is that debt financing is Pareto-superior to 
equity financing, because they induce, under a certain type of contracts, a more 
cooperative behavior (in fact a non-null cooperative behavior). This occurs inde-
pendently of the presence of workers on the executive board. 
In an alternative game, which extends author's one-shot model to allow for a 
longer workers-manager relationship, we reach the conclusion that workers' behav-
ior in both financing scenarios it is a non-null cooperative. We have argued this 
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resuIt is connected with the rise in the completeness of the labor contracts. This is 
so because a more complete contract signals a commitment from the entrepreneur 
to the workers who transfer their commitment to the team by implementing a 
high cooperative effort. Additionally, under a long-term (two-period) relationship 
workers enjoy real power, and even accept to pay an amount in the first period 
to enter the firm, as they can retaliate in future periods against arbitrary actions 
implemented by the manager. 
Our study shows that the financial structure is an ingredient of the corpo-
rate governance of the firm as a balance of power among its agents. We have 
described the social optimum firm's value as the out come to combine a minimum 
workers' power and a financial structure that weighs equity more heavily than 
debt. Shareholders' power is a mechanism to counterweigh high workers' power. 
On the contrary, debtholders' power leans workers' interests against shareholders' 
profits. Finally, with no agent to counterbalance (no workers' power), the financial 
structure of the firm does not generate value on its own. 
To conclude we can say that the in general, it is not a question of Pareto su-
periority of one type of financial contract over the other. The issue becomes one 
of jointly determining the optimal combination of labor and financial contracts 
as a unified definition of the corporate governance of the firmo In this sense, the 
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message of this paper is to emphasize the problem of talking about Pareto su-
periority of debt financial contracts over equity contracts when this comparison 
is absolutely conditioned by the labor contract considered. In the spirit of this 
analysis, if we see the firm as a nexus of contracts, it would seem natural to study 
at a deeper level the relationship between these contracts. On the basis of this, we 
can make a fair comparison between the so-called US paradigm (equity-financed 
firms with short-term labor relationships and payoffs fixed in a tournament ba-
sis) and the Japanese paradigm, based in debt-financed enterprises that define 
long-term labor relationships with their workers in order to stimulate cooperative 
behavior. This is left for future research. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 Note that worker l's performance also depends on the helping effort made 
by worker 2. This extreme assumption, later relaxed in the model, would lead 
workers to implement a null helping effort if the reward scheme were only based 
on a tournament proposal. To stimulate a positive h, part of the workers ' wage 
must be linked to the overall output Q ; which justifies 8 
2 Even if they are not in majority. 
3 Which is the standard reward scheme to minimize the agency costs. 
4 See point 3/ of the es model description. 
5 Although to account for the feature of the contract incompleteness, we follow 
es by not allowing the overalllabor reward scheme to be defined ex-ante. 
6 See for example Garvey and Gastan (1997) and Laband, D. N. & 
Lentz, B. F. (1995). 
7 See the explanation given in the debt and equity financing part of es model 
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APPENDIX 
We are going to compute the equilibrium of the game for both financing sce-
narios using the same formal framework. To solve the game, we use a backward 
induction approach: 
Fifth Stage (Workers Problem in the Second Period ) 
At this stage the maximization problem is identical to es, and for worker 1, as 
the representative worker, it is given by: 
Max{, ,}U'f¡orker=PF(E~2)+W(1-F(E~2))+AQ' -c(a~,h~) (A1.1) 
a 1 ,h1 ' , 
Where E~,2 = a~ + h~ - a~ - h~ and Q' = a~ + h~ + a~ + h~ 
Particularizing for c(a~, h~) = ~[(a~)2 + (h~)2J 
, , 
The FOC over al and hl lead respectively to: 
a~ = A + 6f(0) 
h~ = A - 6f(0) 
(A1.2) 
By the symmetry of the equilibrium a~ = a~ = a' h~ = h~ = h' E~ 2 = E~ 1 = O 
, , 
It is clear to see that the SOC are also satisfied. 
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Fourth Stage (The Manager Problem) 
As we have commented in the text, the manager's objective function is given by: 
Max{>,}UMger = aUSholder + {3UDholder + (1 - a - {3)(2Urorker + 2uIr°rker) 
uSholder = 1;[(Q + Q')(l - 2.-\) - 2(w + p) - D + ,]dG(')') 
UDho1der = D(l - G(~)) + 1:[(Q + Q')(l - 2.-\) - 2(w + p) + ,]dG(')') 
Urorker = pF(El,2) + w(l - F(El,2» +.-\Q - c(al' h1) 
uIr°rker = pF(E~ 2) + w(l - F(E~ 2)) + .-\Q' - c(a~, h~) 
, , 
~ = D + 2(w + p) - (1- 2.-\)(Q + Q') 
(A1.3) 
Where Urorker(uIr°rker) denotes first (second)-period worker 1 utility function. 
Making use of (A1.2), the FOC becomes: 
a[l- G(~)][(~)(l- 2.-\) - 2(Q' + Q)] + f3[G(~)][(~)(l- 2.-\) - 2(Q' + Q)]+ 
+ 2 (1 - a - (3) (Q + Q' + .-\ W - 2.-\) = O 
Applying Q' = 4.-\ the previous express ion adopts a more compact form: 
O = [a(1-G(~»+f3G(~)-(1-a-f3)][4(1-4.-\)-2Q]+4(1-a-{3)(1-.-\) (AlA) 
At this stage, as we consider an exclusive equity-financing scenario, we have to 
fix f3 = O '* ~ = 1. and (AlA) transforms to: 
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0= (2a - 1)[4(1 - 4.-\) - 2Q] + 4(1 - a)(l - .-\) * .-\ = 7C1.~3 - ~g:~i? (AlA') 
Regarding the sao, it is straightforward to see from (A1.2) and (AlA) that for 
1 a2u o 
a 2:: 2* a)..2 < 
It is also direct to see g~ = g~ = - ~g;~il (AlA") which implies precisely that 
low workers' first-period efforts leads the manager to increase the reward in order 
to encourage second-period efforts. 
Third Stage (Workers Problem in the First Period) 
Using symmetry we can focus on worker's 1 maximization problem: 
Max{ uWorker + uWorker 
al,hd [ [[ (A1.5) 
s.t. (AlA) 
FOO over al and h1 leads to: 
a~l {Urorker + Uljorker} = O * a = A + ~f(O) + (Q + Q') g~ (A1.5') 
a~l {Urorker + U]jorker} = O * h = .-\ - ~f(O) + (Q + Q') g~ (A1.5") 
Where we have applied symmetry al = a2 = a E12 = E21 = O , , 
Adding the above expressions and using (AlA"), we get 
a + h = 2.-\ 131:=.15 ' which combined with (AlA) defines the following values: 
A = a(lla - 5) 
S9a2 -7Sa + 17 
a + h = 2a(3a - 1) (A1.6) 
S9a2 - 7Sa + 17 
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Making use of expressions (A1.4"), (A1.6) and anticipating the result of the next 
stage.6. = O, we can ensure the SOC are satisfied: 
82 U _ 8>" ( 2 4 8>") 82 >.. (Q Q') loe 1 8{a,h}2 - 8{a,h} - + 8{a,h} + 8{a,h}2 + - < lor a ~ 2"' 
First and Second Stage (The Entrepreneur Problem) 
The Entrepreneur's maximization problem is given by: 
Max }UFoun {6,p 
UFoun = 1:«Q + Q')(l - 2'x) - 2(w + p) + l')dGb) (A1.7) 
S.t. p + w + >.(Q + Q') = c(a, h) + c(a', h') 
Besides, workers' participation constraint is obtained making use of a zero reser-
vation utility, and the fact that F(E) is unimodal and symmetric around zero 
If we introduce the restriction into the objective function we can obtain: 
;y 
UFoun = 1 {(Q + Q') - 2[c(a,h) + c(a',h')] +1'}dGb) (A1.7') 
r 
The necessary conditions over ,6,. lead to: (p will be computed using the partici-
pation constraint of the workers) 
8U
Foun 
_ O =* O - 8a (1 - a) + 8h (1 - h) + 8a' (1 - a') + 8h' (1 - h') (A 1.7") 86 - - 86 86 86 86 
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Using (A1.2) and (A1.5') we see g~ = gi = f(O) and ~ = fk = - f(O) 
which transforms expression (A1.7") to: -4(6(f(0)2) = O ===* 16 = 01 (A1.8) 
The SOC are trivially satisfied 
Using (A1.8) and (A1.2) we get a' = h' = A 
On the other hand by (A1.8), expressions (A1.5') and (A1.5") ensures that a = h 
Finally if we introduce (A1.8) in the participation constraint of the workers (A1.7), 
we obtain p = -H3(a')2 + a(4a' - aH < O. 
If we put it all together we recover the equilibrium given in Proposition 1 
A * - a(lla-5) * - * - h* - h* _ a(3a-l) 
- 89a2-78a+17 al - a 2 - 1 - 2 - 89a2-78a+17 (A1.9) 
p* = w* < O ai' = ai' = hi' = hi' = A * 
First, we are going to show when the workers' power is null, then, financial 
structure becomes irrelevant. To do so, we focus on the expression (Al.4), and 
fix 1 - a - f3 = O. In that case, we get the following FOC for A: 
o = (a + G(i)(l- 2a))((~)(1- 2A) - 2(Q' + Q)) 
As the first factor a + G(i)(l - 2a) =1= O ; when O:::; a :::; 1, then: 
(~)(1 - 2A) - 2(Q' + Q) = O =} A = i - iQ (A2.l) 
The point is that this A expression can be obtained from (AlA'), when a = 1. 
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p* = w* < O ai' = a'2' = hi' = h'2' = >. * 
First, we are going to show when the workers' power is null, then, financial 
structure becomes irrelevant. To do so, we focus on the expression (A1.4), and 
fix 1 - a - f3 = o. In that case, we get the following FOC for >.: 
O = (a + G(;Y)(l - 2a))((W)(1 - 2>') - 2(Q' + Q)) 
As the first factor a + G(;Y) (1 - 2a) =1- O ; when O ~ a ~ 1, then: 
(~)(1 - 2>') - 2(Q' + Q) = O::} >. = i - ~Q (A2.1) 
The point is that this >. expression can be obtained from (A1.4'), when a = 1. 
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AB all the stages of the game to be solved are formally identical to the previous 
exclusive equity financing scenario, we obtain an equilibrium which is given by 
(A1.9), with a = 1, that is 
A* = -ª-14 * * h* h* 1 al = a2 = 1 = 2 = 14 
p* = w* < O ai' = a'2' = hi' = h'2' = A *
(A2.2) 
In this way, we prove the irrelevance of the financial structure (given by {a,,B}), 
whenever the workers' power 1- a -,B = O. 
Second, to define the combination of debt and equity that lead to the social 
optimum solution, we use again express ion (A1.4), particularizing for a = a' = 
h = h' = A = 1. This is so because under the first-best solution, the marginal 
cost of effort in each period has to be equal to the marginal revenue, that is: 
(a = 1, a' = 1, h = 1, h' = 1). Regarding to A = 1, this is obtained combining 
(A1.2), the previous equality a' = h' = 1 and the fact that /1 = O also works for 
the founder problem in the first-best framework. 
If we arrange in the adequate way the express ion (A1.4), we obtain: 
a[w] = - (l-W)G~-W (A2.3) 
l-2G 'Y 
Making use of the workers' participation constraint we characterize i: 
i = D + 2[C(a, h) + C(a', h')]- (Q + Q') (A2.4) 
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This expression allows to study the SOC for the manager problem that leads to 
expression (A2.3) in the first-best framework. 
!f5. _ a2uMger _ We compute a>. - O => a>.2 - -4w < O 
Besides, (A2.4) allows also to characterize ;y for the first-best solution. We obtain 
;y = D - 4, therefore, as D is exogenously given, we can connect in a natural way 
G(;Y) with the debtholders' power f3. In that case, expression (A2.3) becomes a 
second-order polynomial expression: a2 + a(~w - 1) + Hw2 - 3w + 1) = 0, where 
the positive root is: 
a*[w] = ~ - ~w + [(~ - ~w)2 - ~(1 - 3w + w2)P/2 (A2.5) 
Therefore, only for w ~ w* = 2VIO - 6 < ~, a*[w] is a real express ion. 
Finally, as a* [w = {~, ~}] = {~,!} and da¿wl > 0, if we neglect worker-
managed firms, that is a > w, then, only in the interval ~ ::; w ::; ! is possible to 
reach the social optimum solution, where a = a*[w] and f3 = 1 - a*[w] . 
• 
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